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Abstract
We analyze in this paper finite horizon hierarchical signaling games between (information provider) senders and (decision maker) receivers
in a dynamic environment. The underlying information evolves in time while sender and receiver interact repeatedly. Different from the
classical communication (control) models, however, the sender (sensor) and the receiver (controller) have different objectives and there is
a hierarchy between the players such that the sender leads the game by announcing his policies beforehand. He needs to anticipate the
reaction of the receiver and the impact of the actions on the horizon while controlling the transparency of the disclosed information at each
interaction. With quadratic cost functions and multi-variate Gaussian processes, evolving according to first order auto-regressive models,
we show that memoryless linear sender signaling rules are optimal (in the sense of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium) within the
general class of strategies. We also show that, again in the non-cooperative control context, linear signaling rules and correspondingly
linear control input yield the hierarchical equilibrium within the general class of strategies.
Key words: Stackelberg games; Hierarchical decision making; Communications; Information theory; Dynamic games; Signaling games;
LQG control; Kalman filters.
1 Introduction
In the era of smart devices, we have various systems having
enhanced processing and efficient communication capabili-
ties. Even though information exchange is generally useful
in cooperative multi-agent networks, where each agent has
the same goal, such as in consensus networks [23], diversifi-
cation in smart systems brings about inevitable mismatches
in the objectives of different agents. This then leads to non-
cooperative game formulations for smart systems in the dis-
closure of information [2,3,9,32]. As an example, a trajec-
tory controller can drive a tracking system to a desired path,
different from the tracker’s actual intent, by controlling the
disclosed information [30].
To this end, consider the scenario of a sender (S) having
access to some information and a receiver (R) needing this
information to be able to take a particular action, impacting
both S and R. In the classical communication setting, S seeks
to transmit this information in the best possible way, leading
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to a full cooperation between him/her and R, toward miti-
gating the channel’s impact on the transmitted signals. How-
ever, even if there exists an ideal (perfect) channel between
S and R, if their objectives differ, absolute transparency of
the disclosed information is not a reasonable action for S
in general [2,3,9,32]. In a hierarchial game, also known as
Stackelberg game, [4], R reacts after S’s disclosure of in-
formation. Therefore, in strategic settings, where objectives
differ, S develops strategies 1 to control the transparency of
the disclosed information.
Originally, a scheme of the type introduced in the previous
paragraph, called strategic information transmission, was in-
troduced in a seminal paper by V. Crawford and J. Sobel [9],
and attracted significant attention in the economics literature
due to the wide range of relevant applications, from adver-
tising to expert advise sharing problems [6,11,26]. Here, in
addition to the privately accessed information, S’s objective
function includes a bias term, while R’s objective function is
independent of the bias. Under Nash equilibrium, in which
the players announce their strategies simultaneously, the au-
thors have shown that a quantization-based mapping of the
information achieves Nash equilibrium [9]. In [28], the au-
1 In this paper, we use the terms “policy”, “strategy”, and “sig-
naling rule” interchangeably.
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thors have extended the approach of [9] to noisy and mul-
tidimensional settings for quadratic cost functions. In [13],
the authors extend the one-shot game of strategic informa-
tion transmission to a multi-stage one with a finite horizon,
such that the information provider and decision makers in-
teract several times regarding a constant unknown state of
the world.
Recently, strategic information transmission in hierarchical
signaling games (where there is a hierarchy in the announce-
ment of the strategies) has attracted substantial interest in
various disciplines, including control theory [10,27,30], in-
formation theory [2,3], and economics [12,32]. In [10], the
authors study strategic sensor networks for Gaussian vari-
ables and with myopic quadratic objective functions, i.e., the
players construct strategies just for the current stage irrespec-
tive of the length of the horizon, by restricting the receiver
strategies to affine functions. Reference [30] addresses the
optimality of linear sender strategies within the general class
of policies for myopic quadratic objectives. In [27, 28], the
authors show that for scalar parameters, quadratic cost func-
tions, and a commonly known bias parameter, the hierarchi-
cal game formulation can be converted into a team problem.
Reference [3] shows that linear sender strategies achieve the
equilibrium within the general class of policies even with
additive Gaussian noise channels. In [32], the author demon-
strates the optimality of linear sender strategies also for the
multivariate Gaussian information, and with quadratic cost
functions. In [12], the authors address the optimality of full
or no disclosure for general information parameters.
In addition to the mismatched objectives in a communication
system, the signaling game setting can also be considered
as a dynamic deception game [16, 17, 25], where a player
aims to deceive the other player, say victim, such that the
victim’s perception about an underlying phenomenon and
correspondingly the victim’s reaction is controlled in a de-
sirable way. Hence, this approach brings about new security
and resilience applications for cyber-physical systems that
are vulnerable to cyber attacks, e.g., power grids, transporta-
tion systems, and cloud networks [18, 19, 33]. In particular,
turning the problem around, new defense mechanisms can
be developed aiming to arouse attackers’ suspicion on com-
promised information or to deceive attackers to take certain
actions. Additionally, the resulting scheme would be advan-
tageous for the defender, i.e., sender in the strategic com-
munication scheme, in terms of his/her objectives due to the
hierarchical structure, and therefore would be more prefer-
able for security related scenarios.
Recent Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR)
[1] shows that millions of people have been affected by
and substantial amount of financial loss has occurred due to
cyber attacks. Furthermore, many of the attacks are either
unreported or not yet discovered by the victim. Importantly,
in 93% of the attacks, the attackers can infiltrate into the
system within minutes and even seconds, and in 68% of the
attacks the attackers exfiltrate the system within days [1].
Therefore, if attackers succeed in infiltrating into the system,
an additional layer of defense based on dynamic deception
can play a vital role for the security of the system [22]. The
experiment conducted in blue (defender) and red (attacker)
teams from Lockheed Martin [20] is an illustrative example
of the effectiveness of deception strategies even when the
confidential information has been compromised.
Now, coming to the specifics of this paper, we obtain here
equilibrium achieving sender strategies in hierarchical (i.e.,
Stackelberg [4]) multi-stage signaling games with finite hori-
zon, where hierarchically S is the leader such that his/her
strategies are known by (and enforced on) R. We show
that memoryless linear sender strategies and linear receiver
strategies can yield multi-stage equilibrium with finite hori-
zon for general quadratic objective functions and multi-
variate Gaussian processes evolving according to first order
auto-regressive models. This extends the result for the op-
timality of linear strategies shown in [32] to the dynamic
setting. We point out that in the dynamic setting, in addi-
tion to the mismatches between the objectives, S should also
control the transparency of the disclosed information due to
impact of the actions on future stages. At each stage, S faces
a trade-off in terms of the current stage and all other future
stages of the game while controlling the transparency of the
disclosed information, and should develop strategies in a
comprehensive manner over the horizon. We point out that
reference [29] addresses, in a two-stage setting, the purity
of sender strategies (whether policies should include irrele-
vant information or not) by restricting the sender policies to
affine functions, but does not completely solve the problem.
However, here we show that pure linear strategies achieve
the equilibrium within the general class of policies.
After obtaining equilibrium achieving policies in the multi-
stage strategic communication game, we extend the results
to non-cooperative strategic control, where sensor and con-
troller of a dynamic system have different objectives. As an
example, the controller aims to drive the system to a desired
path based on the sensor outputs, while the sensor designs
the sensor outputs to deceive the controller so that the sys-
tem is driven to a path different from the controller’s actual
intent. Such a scheme can have important applications in re-
silience of cyber-physical systems under adversarial attacks.
Even though attackers have infiltrated into the controller and
gained access to control the system, the damage could be
minimized via the strategic sensor outputs. Furthermore, the
sensors of the system could also be infiltrated into by the at-
tackers, which can cancel the proposed defense mechanism
via a shortcut to the state realization if the sensors have ac-
cess to the actual state realizations. In order to mitigate that,
we consider the scenario where the sensors do not have ac-
cess to the actual state realizations, and the sensor signal-
ing rules are selected beforehand to minimize the expected
loss and fixed (can be time-variant, yet not controlled) dur-
ing the operation. We show that linear sensor and controller
signaling rules can achieve the hierarchical equilibrium for
controlled Gauss-Markov processes and under finite horizon
quadratic cost functions.
2
Particularly, the proposed formulation can be considered as
a passive defense strategy that can be incorporated along
with active defense strategies [22]. Consider the scenarios,
where infiltration detection mechanisms (an active defense
mechanism) have detected adversarial infiltration into the
controller of the cyber-physical system and characterized
the control objective of the adversary. And there is certain
necessary time before disabling the access of the attacker
to the controller. For that time interval, which can be con-
sidered as the time horizon in our formulation, the system
can switch to the proposed passive defense mode, where
the sensor outputs are constructed to minimize the damage
due to the attack. We emphasize that no information will be
shared with the attacker except the sensor outputs (which
can also be non-informative). Importantly, the defender will
not provide his/her strategy as to how the sensor outputs are
constructed to the attacker. However, the problem still can
be considered as a Stackelberg game, where the sensor is
the leader, because this is a passive defense mechanism that
does not depend on the actual realizations, i.e., the sensor
seeks to minimize the expected cost, and the attacker, hav-
ing access to the system, can be aware of the switch to this
passive defense mode and correspondingly can know how
the sensor outputs will have been constructed.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We study dynamic hierarchical Gaussian signaling games
with finite horizon for general quadratic cost functions.
• We formulate a functional minimization problem whose
solutions correspond to the equilibrium achieving signal-
ing rules, and we characterize the solutions through a finite
dimensional optimization problem bounding the original
problem from below.
• We show that linear sender and receiver signaling rules
can yield the equilibrium for arbitrary (finitely many)
number of stages.
• We show that in multi-stage case, the sub-games at each-
stage are not decoupled and cannot be considered as
single-stage games, where the innovation part of the state
is to be disclosed.
• We extend the results for controlled Gauss-Markov pro-
cesses and show that linear sensor and controller strate-
gies can achieve the hierarchical equilibrium under a fi-
nite horizon.
• Even though we only characterize the equilibrium achiev-
ing strategies and show that they are linear-in-parameters
rather than providing them in closed analytical forms,
the characterization can be used to compute the optimal
strategies by solving a semi-definite-programming prob-
lem numerically in both strategic communication and con-
trol contexts.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we pro-
vide the problem description. In Section 3, we introduce and
analyze strategic communication scenario, and we provide
the equilibrium achieving policies in Section 4. We analyze
strategic control scenario in Section 5. We provide numeri-
cal examples for different strategic communication and con-
trol scenarios in Section 6. We conclude the paper in Sec-
tion 7 with several remarks. Appendices provide proofs for
technical results.
Notations: For an ordered set of parameters, e.g., x1, · · · ,xn,
we define x[k,l] := xk, · · · ,xl , where 1≤ k≤ l ≤ n. N(0, .) de-
notes the multivariate Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and designated covariance. We denote random variables by
bold lower case letters, e.g., x. For a random variable x, xˆ is
another random variable corresponding to its posterior belief
conditioned on certain random variables that will be appar-
ent from the context. For a vector x and a matrix A, x′ and
A′ denote their transposes, and ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean
(L2) norm of the vector x. For a matrix A, tr{A} denotes its
trace. We denote the identity and zero matrices with the as-
sociated dimensions by I and O, respectively. For positive
semi-definite matrices A and B, A  B means that A−B is
also a positive semi-definite matrix.
2 Problem Description
Consider a controlled stochastic system described by the
following state equation 2 :
xk+1 = Axk +Buk +wk, (1)
for k= 1, . . . ,n, where 3 A∈Rp×p, B∈Rp×t , x1 ∼N(0,Σ1).
The additive noise process {wk} is a white Gaussian vector
process, e.g., wk ∼N(0,Σw), and is independent of the intial
state x1. The closed loop control vector uk ∈ Rt is given by
uk = γk(y[1,k]), (2)
where γk(·) is a Borel measurable function from Rpk to Rt .
The message signal yk ∈ Rp is given by
yk = ηk(xo[1,k]), (3)
where ηk(·) is a Borel measurable function from Rpk to Rp
and the virtual state xok evolves according to
xok+1 = Ax
o
k +wk, (4)
which can be constructed via
xok+1 = Ax
o
k +(xk+1−Axk−Buk).
We assume that the auto-covariance matrices Σ1 and Σw are
all positive definite.
2 Even though we consider time invariant matrices A and B for
notational simplicity, the provided derivations can be extended to
time-variant cases rather routinely. Furthermore, we consider all
the random variables have zero mean; however, the derivations can
also be extended to the non-zero mean case in a straight-forward
way.
3 We assume that the matrix A is non-singular.
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Fig. 1. Multi-stage signaling game model.
As seen in Fig. 1, we have two agents: Sender (S) and Re-
ceiver (R), who select signaling rules under different objec-
tives. For stage k, S selects the signaling rule ηk(·) from
the policy space Ωk, which is the set of all Borel mea-
surable functions from Rkp to Rp, i.e., ηk ∈ Ωk, such that
yk = ηk(xo[1,k]). On the other side, R selects the signaling
rule γk(·) from the policy space Γk, which is the set of all
Borel measurable functions from Rkp to Rt , i.e., γk ∈ Γk,
such that uk = γk(y[1,k]). S and R have quadratic finite hori-
zon cost functions 4 JS(η[1,n];γ[1,n]) and JR(η[1,n];γ[1,n]), re-
spectively, while each signaling rule implicitly depends on
the other. In the following, we introduce a hierarchical equi-
librium concept for the signaling rules with respect to these
cost functions, JS and JR. Particularly, we consider the sit-
uation where there is a hierarchy between the agents in the
announcement of the policies such that S leads the game by
announcing and sticking to his/her policies beforehand and
R reacts to those policies accordingly. We can model such a
scheme as a Stackelberg game between the players [4] such
that the leader, i.e., S, chooses his signaling rule based on
the corresponding best response of the follower, i.e., R.
Due to the hierarchy, R’s signaling rule γk can depend on
S’s signaling rules η[1,k]. In order to explicitly show the de-
pendence on S’s policies, henceforth, we denote R’s policies
by 5 γk(η[1,k]), i.e., γk(η[1,k])(yk) := γk(y[1,k]). Then, for each
n-tuple of policies ηk ∈ Ωk, k = 1, . . . ,n, we let ΠR(η[1,n])
be the reaction set of R, as a subset of ⨉nk=1Γk. For finite-
horizon objectives, we have
ΠR(η[1,n]) := arg minγk∈Γk,
k=1,...,n
JR(η[1,n];γ[1,n](η[1,n])),
where γ[1,n](η[1,n]) := {γ1(η1), . . . ,γn(η[1,n])}. In the follow-
ing sections, when we provide the objective functions for
the associated scenarios explicitly, we will also show that
ΠR is an equivalence class such that all γ∗[1,n] ∈ ΠR lead
4 We provide these functions explicitly in the following sections
under different scenarios, e.g., strategic information disclosure and
control.
5 Without loss of generality, we can also consider that γk(η[1,n]) =
γk(η[1,k]).
to the same random variable u∗k almost surely under cer-
tain convexity assumptions. Therefore, the pair of signaling
rules
(
η∗[1,n],γ
∗
[1,n]
)
attains the multi-stage Stackelberg equi-
librium provided that
η∗[1,n] = arg minηk∈Ωk,
k=1,...,n
JS
(
η[1,n];γ∗[1,n](η[1,n])
)
, (5a)
γ∗[1,n](η[1,n]) = arg minγk∈Γk,
k=1,...,n
JR(η[1,n];γ[1,n](η[1,n])). (5b)
Remark 1 We note that the hierarchical equilibrium (5) im-
plies that S’s signaling rules do not depend on the realiza-
tions of the random variables and all of them can be selected
beforehand since they also do not depend on R’s signaling
rules. Such an equilibrium formulation, where S strategies
do not depend on the actual realizations, i.e., where S does
not have access to the realizations, is essential for the cyber-
security related applications in order to avoid shortcuts that
can cancel the proposed defense mechanism once the at-
tacker also infiltrates into S. Furthermore, S should antic-
ipate R’s reaction to any selected strategy since even if S
might have incentive to come up with another policy based
on R’s policy, any change in S’s policy would also imply a
change in R’s policy accordingly due to the hierarchy.
In the following sections, we analyze the equilibrium achiev-
ing signaling rules, i.e.,
(
η∗[1,n],γ
∗
[1,n]
)
, under strategic infor-
mation disclosure and control scenarios.
3 Strategic Information Disclosure
Here, we consider a strategic communication scenario,
which is a special case of (1), where B = O such that state
{xk} is an exogenous process rather than a controlled pro-
cess. Following this, we use the results obtained to charac-
terize the equilibrium achieving signaling rules for the orig-
inal case (1), i.e., strategic control scenario. The underlying
state, now, is a Markov process (not necessarily stationary)
evolving according to first-order auto-regressive model:
xk+1 = Axk +wk, k = 1, . . . ,n (6)
and at stage-k, state xk is a zero-mean Gaussian random
vector with auto-covariance matrix Σk, which is given by
the following recursion: Σk = AΣk−1A′+Σw for k = 2, . . . ,n.
Note that correspondingly, the virtual state xok = xk. If S
and R have the same cost functions, the best signaling rule
of S can be direct information disclosure, i.e., ηk(xo[1,k]) =
xok = xk since there is a perfect channel between the agents.
However, when S and R’s cost functions are different, direct
information disclosure may not be in S’s best interest.
Consider the situation where S and R have the following
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quadratic finite horizon cost functions:
JS(η[1,n];γ[1,n]) = E
{
n
∑
k=1
‖QS,kxk +RS,kuk‖2
}
, (7)
JR(η[1,n];γ[1,n]) = E
{
n
∑
k=1
‖QR,kxk +RR,kuk‖2
}
, (8)
where QS,k,QR,k ∈ Rr×p and RS,k,RR,k ∈ Rr×t . Note that
uk = γk(η[1,k])(y[1,k]) while yl = ηl(xo[1,l]) almost surely. We
assume that R′R,kRR,k is positive definite, i.e., RR,k is full
rank, for all k = 1, . . . ,n. Then, there is a linear relationship
between the best R policies γ∗k and the posterior
xˆk := E{xk|y[1,k]}.
Since B=O, by (8), γk only impacts the sub-cost function at
stage-k, i.e., E{‖QR,kxk+RR,kuk‖2}. Correspondingly, given
η[1,k], the best R strategy is given by
γ∗k (η[1,k]) = arg minγk∈Γk
E
{‖QR,kxk +RR,kγk(η[1,k])(y[1,k])‖2}
and by the positive definiteness assumption on R′R,kRR,k O,
we have
γ∗k (η[1,k])(y[1,k]) =−(R′R,kRR,k)−1R′R,kQR,k xˆk,
almost everywhere, which also implies that ΠR(η[1,n]) is a
singleton.
Example 2 This non-cooperative communication formula-
tion between S and R also covers the schemes where there
exist two separate exogenous processes such that [30][
zk+1
θ k+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=xk+1
=
[
Az
Aθ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
[
zk
θ k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=xk
+
[
ω k
ν k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=wk
. (9)
R aims to track the process {zk} through the disclosed in-
formation yk while S wants R’s decision uk to track a linear
combination of zk and a bias parameter θ k, e.g., zk+Dkθ k.
In particular, the cost functions are in this case given by
JS(η[1,n];γ[1,n]) = E
{
n
∑
k=1
‖zk +Dkθ k−uk‖2
}
(10)
JR(η[1,n];γ[1,n]) = E
{
n
∑
k=1
‖zk−uk‖2
}
(11)
such that in (7) and (8), QS,k = [ I Dk ], QR,k = [ I O ], and
RS,k = RR,k =−I for k = 1, . . . ,n.
We note that in [27], the authors also study dynamic cheap
talk and signaling games with quadratic cost functions, but
for a scalar state and a commonly known bias parameter
in the setup of Example 2. Therefore, different from our
scheme, in [27] the non-cooperative Stackelberg game turns
into a strategically equivalent team problem such that S and
R end up having the same objectives.
Corresponding to R’s best reactions, S seeks policies η∗k
which minimize the expected cost over ηk ∈Ωk. Particularly,
the optimization problem faced by S is given by
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1,...,n
E
{‖QS,kxk−RS,k(R′R,kRR,k)−1R′R,kQR,k xˆk‖2} . (12)
Note that (12) is a functional optimization problem, where S
seeks to find n functions among all Borel measurable func-
tions from Rkp to Rp, for k = 1, . . . ,n. In order to find these
functions, we first aim to formulate an optimization prob-
lem over finite dimensional spaces that bounds the original
functional optimization problem (12) from below. The ob-
jective in (12) is a quadratic function of xk and xˆk, and in the
following we show that the cost function (12) can be written
in terms of the second-order moments of xk and xˆk:
E
{‖QS,kxk−RS,k(R′R,kRR,k)−1R′R,kQR,k xˆk‖2}
= E
{
x′kQ
′
S,kQS,kxk
}
−2E
{
xˆ′kΛ
′
kQS,kxk
}
+E
{
xˆ′kΛ
′
kΛkxˆk
}
,
where Λk := RS,k(R′R,kRR,k)
−1R′R,kQR,k. Note that the first
term on the right hand side does not include xˆk, and therefore
does not depend on S’s signaling rules. For the second term,
we have
E{xˆ′k∆xk}
(a)
= E{E{xˆ′k∆xk|y[1,k]}}
(b)
= E{xˆ′k∆E{xk|y[1,k]}}
(c)
= E{xˆ′k∆xˆk}, (13)
where ∆ is an arbitrary deterministic matrix with associated
dimensions. The equality (a) is due to the law of iterated
expectations; (b) holds because xˆk is σ -y[1,k] measurable;
and (c) is due to xˆk = E{xk|y[1,k]}. Therefore,
2E
{
xˆ′kΛ
′
kQS,kxk
}
= E
{
xˆ′k(Λ
′
kQS,k +Q
′
S,kΛk)xk
}
= E
{
xˆ′k(Λ
′
kQS,k +Q
′
S,kΛk)xˆk
}
. (14)
Then, we can re-write the optimization problem (12) as
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
E{xˆ′kVkxˆk}, (15)
where
Vk := Λ′kΛk−Λ′kQS,k−Q′S,kΛk. (16)
As an example, for Example 2, we have Vk :=
[ −I −Dk
−Dk O
]
.
We point out that in Reference [32], the author addresses
multi-dimensional information disclosure for the single-
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stage case. To this end, he constructs a Semi-Definite Pro-
gramming (SDP) problem as a bound on sender’s objective
function (named utility function in [32]) and shows that
linear strategies for Gaussian parameters can achieve this
bound. Here, we employ a similar approach to extend these
results to the dynamic setting by addressing the question
of whether the linear strategies are still optimal within the
general class of policies or not.
The first-order moment of xˆk is
E{xˆk}= E{E{xk|y[1,k]}}
= E{xk}= 0 (17)
by the law of iterated expectations. We define the covari-
ance matrix of xˆk, namely the posterior covariance, as Hk :=
E{(xˆk−E{xˆk})(xˆk−E{xˆk})′}= E{xˆkxˆ′k}. We note that for
multivariate Gaussian variables, the mean is well defined,
which implies that xˆk exists by the Radon-Nikodym theo-
rem [7]. Furthermore, being multivariate Gaussian, the state
parameter is integrable, i.e., E{|xk|}< ∞, hence xˆk is finite
almost surely, which implies that H = E{xˆkxˆ′k} also exists.
The following lemma provides a lower bound for the mini-
mization problem in (15).
Lemma 3 There exists a semi-definite programming (SDP)
problem bounding the minimization problem (15) from below
and given by 6
min
Sk∈Sp,
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
tr{VkSk} (18)
subject to Σ j  S j  AS j−1A′ for j = 1, . . . ,n, and S0 = O.
PROOF. The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
We point out that (18) is indeed an SDP problem [8]. There
exist effective computational tools to solve SDP problems
numerically, e.g., through CVX, a package for specifying
and solving convex programs [14,15]. However, closed-form
solutions can rarely be obtained [8]. Therefore, in order to
solve (18) analytically, we develop a different approach and
characterize the solutions without computing them explic-
itly. The following theorem characterizes the solution of (18)
for an arbitrary (but finite) number of stages.
Theorem 4 There exist symmetric idempotent matrices Pk ∈
Sp, for k = 1, . . . ,n, such that
S∗k = AS
∗
k−1A
′+(Σk−AS∗k−1A′)1/2Pk(Σk−AS∗k−1A′)1/2,
(19)
for k = 1, . . . ,n (with S∗0 = O), attains the global minimum
of (18).
6 Sp denotes the set of symmetric p× p matrices.
PROOF. We first point out that the constraint set in (18),
i.e.,
Ψ :=
{
(S1, ...,Sn) ∈ Sp× ...×Sp
∣∣∣∧
k
{Sk ∈Ψk(Sk−1)}
}
,
(20)
where Ψk(Sk−1) := {Sk ∈ Sp | Σk  Sk  ASk−1A′}, is con-
vex. To show this, consider n-tuples of symmetric matrices
(M1, . . . ,Mn)∈ Sp×·· ·×Sp and (N1, . . . ,Nn)∈ Sp×·· ·×Sp
such that both (M1, . . . ,Mn) and (N1, . . . ,Nn) are in the con-
straint set Ψ. Then, Ψ is a convex set if, and only if, for any
t ∈ [0,1], the linear combination
(E1, . . . ,En) : = t(M1, . . . ,Mn)+(1− t)(N1, . . . ,Nn)
= (tM1+(1− t)N1, . . . , tMn+(1− t)Nn) ∈Ψ.
Since Σ1 M1  O and Σ1  N1  O, we have
Σ1  tM1+(1− t)N1  O,
and E1 = tM1 + (1− t)N1 ∈ Ψ1(O). Suppose that E j ∈
Ψ j(E j−1) for j = 1, . . . ,k− 1. Since Σk  Mk  AMk−1A′,
Σk  Nk  ANk−1A′, and Ek−1 = tMk−1 +(1− t)Nk−1, we
obtain
Σk  tMk +(1− t)Nk  AEk−1A′,
and Ek = tMk + (1− t)Nk ∈ Ψk(Ek−1). By induction, we
conclude that the convex combination (E1, . . . ,En) ∈Ψ and
therefore Ψ is a convex set. Note that since the objective
function in (18) is linear in S1, . . . ,Sn (not a zero function)
and the constraint set is non-empty compact (since Ψ is a
cartesian product of the closed and bounded sets Ψk(Sk−1))
and convex, the global minimum is attained at the extreme
points of Ψ. 7
Next, we formulate the extreme points of Ψ. To this end, for
given S−k := {S1, . . . ,Sk−1,Sk+1, . . . ,Sn}, we introduce the
sub-constraint set:
Φk(S−k) :=
{
Sk ∈ Sp | Σk  Sk  ASk−1A′
∧ A−1Sk+1(A′)−1  Sk  ASk−1A′
}
, (21)
for each k = 1, . . . ,n, where we set S0 = O and Sn+1 =
AΣnA′ + Σw. We consider that the sub-constraint set
Φk(S−k) =∅ is empty if Σk−ASk−1A′ or A−1Sk+1(A′)−1−
ASk−1A′ are not positive semi-definite. Then, the follow-
ing lemma provides a necessary condition for the extreme
points of Ψ in terms of these sub-constraint sets (21).
Lemma 5 If an n-tuple (E1, . . . ,En)∈Ψ is an extreme point
of Ψ, then for each k = 1, . . . ,n, Ek ∈Φk(E−k) is an extreme
point of Φk(E−k).
7 An extreme point of a convex set is a point that cannot be
written as a convex combination of any other points in the interior
of the set.
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PROOF. The proof is provided in Appendix B. 
Now, we seek to obtain the extreme points through the nec-
essary conditions provided in Lemma 5. Let (S∗1, . . . ,S
∗
n)∈Ψ
be an extreme point of Ψ. Then, the element S∗n should be
an extreme point of Φn(S∗−n). To this end, consider arbitrary
S1, . . . ,Sn. Then, in stage-n, the sub-constraint set Φn(S−n)
is given by
Φn(S−n) = {Sn ∈ Sp|Σn  Sn  ASn−1A′}
since we set Sn+1 = AΣnA′ + Σw and A−1(AΣnA′ +
Σw)(A′)−1 = Σn+A−1Σw(A′)−1  Σn. We note that for each
k = 1, . . . ,n, if Σk  Sk, then the matrix Σk+1 − ASkA′ is
positive definite because
Σk+1−ASkA′ = AΣkA′+Σw−ASkA′ = A(Σk−Sk)A′+Σw
and Σw  O by definition. Then, if Σn−1  Sn−1, we have
Σn  ASn−1A′ and the following transformation:
Fn(Sn) := (Σn−ASn−1A′)−1/2(Sn−ASn−1A′)
× (Σn−ASn−1A′)−1/2
such that Fn maps the sub-constraint set Φn(S−n) to
Fn(Φn(S−n)) = {P ∈ Sp|I  P O}.
The following lemma characterizes the extreme points of
the convex set Φ := {P ∈ Sp | I  P O}.
Lemma 6 A point Pe in Φ is an extreme point if, and only
if, Pe is a symmetric idempotent matrix.
PROOF. The proof is provided in Appendix C. 
We note that under bijective affine transformation of a con-
vex set, the extreme points are mapped to the extreme points
of the transformed set [31]. Since Fn(·) is a bijective affine
transformation, Po ∈ Φ is an extreme point of Φ if, and
only if, F−1n (Po) ∈Φn(S−n) is an extreme point of Φn(S−n).
Therefore, if Σn−1  Sn−1, the extreme points of Φn(S−n)
are given by
S∗n = ASn−1A
′+(Σn−ASn−1A′)1/2Pn(Σn−ASn−1A′)1/2,
where Pn is a symmetric idempotent matrix.
For stage-(n−1), we have the sub-constraint set:
Φn−1(S−(n−1)) = {Sn−1 ∈ Sp|Σn−1  Sn−1  ASn−2A′
∧ A−1Sn(A′)−1  Sn−1  ASn−2A′}.
We point out that if Sn−1 ∈Φn−1(S−(n−1)), we have Σn−1 
Sn−1. Then, setting Sn = S∗n, we obtain
Φn−1(S−(n−1)) = {Sn−1 ∈ Sp|Σn−1  Sn−1  ASn−2A′
∧ Sn−1+∆ Sn−1  ASn−2A′},
where
∆ := A−1(Σn−ASn−1A′)1/2Pn(Σn−ASn−1A′)1/2(A′)−1 O.
Therefore, if Sn is an extreme point of Φn(S−n), the sub-
constraint set Φn−1(S−(n−1)) can be written as
Φn−1(S−(n−1)) = {Sn−1 ∈ Sp|Σn−1  Sn−1  ASn−2A′}.
Correspondingly, if Σn−2  Sn−2, the extreme points of
Φn−1(S−(n−1)) are given by
S∗n−1 =ASn−2A
′+(Σn−1−ASn−2A′)1/2Pn−1(Σn−1−ASn−2A′)1/2,
where Pn−1 is also a symmetric idempotent matrix. Since
Σn−1  S∗n−1, setting Sn−1 = S∗n−1, we have
S∗n = AS
∗
n−1A
′+(Σn−AS∗n−1A′)1/2Pn(Σn−AS∗n−1A′)1/2.
Following identical steps, we obtain that any extreme point
(S∗1, . . . ,S
∗
n) of Ψ should satisfy (19). 
In the next section, we address the tightness of the bound
(18), i.e., whether the lower bound can be achieved through
certain sender policies or not.
4 Equilibrium Achieving Signaling Rules
Even though Theorem 4 characterizes the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the minimizing arguments of the SDP
problem (18), it still does not provide the solutions explic-
itly. However, as we will show next, these results have im-
portant consequences in the characterization of equilibrium
achieving signaling rules for the original optimization prob-
lem (15). In particular, sender strategies that can be con-
structed to yield posterior covariances in (19) can minimize
the lower bound (18), and therefore can minimize the main
objective function (15).
The following theorem says that for any solution of (18),
say S∗1, . . . ,S
∗
n, there exist certain deterministic matrices Lk ∈
Rp×p for k = 1, . . . ,n, such that the memoryless linear dis-
closure policies
ηk(xo[1,k]) = L
′
kx
o
k = L
′
kxk, (22)
result in the posterior covariance matrices H1 = S∗1, . . . ,Hn =
S∗n. In particular, by minimizing the lower bound on S’s
objective function, the memoryless linear sender policies
(22) yield the multi-stage Stackelberg equilibrium within the
general class of policies.
Theorem 7 Let S∗1, . . . ,S
∗
n be a solution of the SDP problem
(18) and P1, . . . ,Pn be the corresponding symmetric idem-
potent matrices in (19). Let Pk, k = 1, . . . ,n, have the eigen
decompositions: Pk =UkΛkU ′k. Then, for
Lk = (Σk−AS∗k−1A′)−1/2UkΛk, (23)
7
memoryless linear sender strategies (22) yield the multi-
stage equilibrium (15) within the general class of policies.
PROOF. Say that S employs memoryless linear policies
as in (22) for some deterministic combination of matri-
ces L1, . . . ,Ln ∈Rp×p. Correspondingly, the posteriors xˆk =
E{xk|y[1,k]}= E{xk|L′1x1, . . . ,L′kxk} are given by 8
xˆ1 =Σ1L1(L′1Σ1L1)
†L′1x1 (24)
xˆk =Axˆk−1+(Σk−AHk−1A′)Lk(L′k(Σk−AHk−1A′)Lk)†
×L′k(xk−Axˆk−1) for k ≥ 2. (25)
Next, we seek to compute Hk =E{xˆkxˆ′k}, for k= 1, . . . ,n. By
(24), we obtain H1 = Σ1L1(L′1Σ1L1)
†L′1Σ1 since E{x1x′1}=
Σ1, and for a matrix M and its pseudo-inverse M†, we
have M†MM† = M. By (25), for H2, we have a cross-term
E{xˆ1(x2−Axˆ1)′}, which can be written as
E{xˆ1(x2−Axˆ1)′}= E{xˆ1x′2}−E{xˆ1xˆ′1}A′
= H1A′−H1A′ = O,
due to the law of iterated expectations such that E{xˆ1x′2}=
E{E{xˆ1x′2|y1}}=E{xˆ1E{x′2|y1}}=E{xˆ1xˆ′1}A′. Then, (25),
for k ≥ 2, leads to
Hk = AHk−1A′+(Σk−AHk−1A′)Lk
× (L′k(Σk−AHk−1A′)Lk)†L′k(Σk−AHk−1A′).
Let C1 := Σ
1/2
1 L1 and Ck := (Σk −AHk−1A′)1/2Lk for k =
2, . . . ,n, such that H1 = Σ
1/2
1 C1(C
′
1C1)
†C ′1Σ
1/2
1 , and for k ≥
2,
Hk = AHk−1A′+(Σk−AHk−1A′)1/2
×Ck(C ′kCk)†C ′k(Σk−AHk−1A′)1/2. (26)
Note that Ck(C
′
kCk)
†C ′k , for k = 1, . . . ,n, is a symmetric
idempotent matrix and the posterior covariances H1, . . . ,Hn
have identical expressions as in (19). If the symmetric idem-
potent matrices Pk for k = 1, . . . ,n corresponding to the min-
imizers of the SDP problem (18) have the eigen decom-
positions: Pk = UkΛkU ′k, we can set Ck = UkΛk for k =
1, . . . ,n, such that Ck(C
′
kCk)
†C ′k = Pk. In particular, setting
L1 = Σ
−1/2
1 U1Λ1 and Lk = (Σk−AS∗k−1A′)−1/2UkΛk, we ob-
tain Hk = S∗k for k = 1, . . . ,n. Hence, the memoryless linear
signaling rules (22) can minimize the main objective func-
tion (15) within the general class of policies. 
In Table 1, we provide a description to compute the equi-
librium achieving sender policies based on Lemma 3, and
Theorems 4 and 7. We note that for linear sender signal-
ing rules, the corresponding equilibrium achieving receiver
8 We take the pseudo inverse of the matrices since they can be
singular if the associated matrix Lk has a rank smaller than p. For
example, at stage-k, S can disclose no information ηk(xo[1,k]) = 0.
Table 1
A description to compute equilibrium achieving sender policies
in strategic communication.
Algorithm 1: Strategic Communication
SDP Problem:
Compute Vk, ∀k, by (16).
Solve the SDP problem (18) through a numerical toolbox
and obtain the solution S∗k , ∀k.
Set S∗0 = O.
Equilibrium achieving policies:
Compute the corresponding idempotent matrices Pk,∀k,
by using S∗k , ∀k, and (19).
Compute the eigen decompositions: Pk =UkΛkU ′k.
Compute Lk, ∀k, by using S∗k−1,Uk,Λk, and (23).
signaling rules are also linear since the underlying state is
Gaussian. Therefore, linear sender and receiver signaling
rules can achieve the equilibrium.
In the following, we provide several remarks about the re-
sults:
• In addition to the memoryless linear sender strategies
in Theorem 7, any signaling rule leading to the same
posteriors can yield the equilibrium. As an example, if
yk = L′kxk for k = 1, . . . ,n achieves the equilibrium, then
y˜1 = y1 and y˜k = yk−E{yk|y[1,k−1]} for k = 2, . . . ,n lead
to the same posteriors, i.e., E{xk|y˜[1,k]}= E{xk|y[1,k]} for
k = 1, . . . ,n, therefore yield the equilibrium. Note that
y˜[1,n] is a whitened version of y[1,n], i.e., y˜k’s are pair-wise
independent of each other.
• In general, when S and R have different cost functions,
signaling rules: ηk(x[1,k]) = K′k(xk −E{xk|x[1,k−1]}), for
certain matrices Kk ∈ Rp×p (where xk−E{xk|x[1,k−1]}=
wk−1 is the innovation in the state process) do not lead
to the equilibrium, contrary to the case when they have
the same cost functions. In particular, in the multi-stage
case, the sub-games at each stage are not decoupled and
cannot be considered as a single stage game as if the
innovation part of the state is going to be disclosed. As
an example, let Σ1 =O such that x2 =w1; then y2 =K′2w1
and y3 = K′3w2. This implies that
H2 = ΣwK2(K′2ΣwK2)
†K′2Σw
H3 = AH2A′+ΣwK3(K′3ΣwK3)
†K′3Σw.
However, by Theorem 4, the corresponding Sk’s are
S2 = Σ
1/2
2 P2Σ
1/2
2 = Σ
1/2
w P2Σ
1/2
w ,
S3 = AS2A′+(Σ3−AS2A′)1/2P3(Σ3−AS2A′)1/2.
We can set K2 such that H2 = S2; however, H3 = S3 re-
8
quires that
Σ1/2w K3(K′3ΣwK3)
†K′3Σ
1/2
w = Σ
−1/2
w (Σ3−AS2A′)1/2
×P3(Σ3−AS2A′)1/2Σ−1/2w . (27)
Note that the left hand side of (27) is a symmetric idem-
potent matrix, however, the right hand side is not neces-
sarily an idempotent matrix.
• The results would hold if the message space was larger
than p since it would also lead to the same constraint set
Ψ (20). However, the derivations would not carry over
if S had access to noisy version of the state instead of
the actual state. As an example, consider the situation
where S has access to zk =Cxok +vk, where C ∈Rp×p and{vk ∼ N(0,Σv)} is an independent white Gaussian noise
process. Then, for yk = L′kzk, the posteriors would be given
by
xˆ1 = Σ1C′L1(L′1CΣ1C
′L1+L′1ΣvL1︸ ︷︷ ︸)†L′1z1
xˆk = Axˆk−1+(Σk−AHk−1A′)C′Lk
× [L′kC(Σk−AHk−1A′)C′Lk +L′kΣvLk︸ ︷︷ ︸]†L′k(zk−CAxˆk−1)
and due to the underbraced term L′kΣvLk, (Σk −
AHk−1A′)−1/2(Hk−AHk−1A′)(Σk−AHk−1A′)−1/2 would
not lead to a symmetric idempotent matrix, contrary to
(26).
• For the single stage case, i.e., n = 1, as in [32], the lower
bound (18) is given by
min
S∈Sp
tr{V1S} (28)
subject to Σ1  S  O. And the optimizer is given by
S∗ = Σ1/21 QQ
′Σ1/21 , where Q= [q1 ··· qm ] and q j ∈Rp, j =
1, . . . ,m, are the eigenvectors of Σ1/21 V1Σ
1/2
1 corresponding
to negative eigenvalues. This also implies that in the multi-
stage case, i.e., n > 1, the rank of Lk is bounded from
above by the number of negative eigenvalues of Vk due to
Sylvester’s law of inertia [21].
In the next section, we analyze the equilibrium in the strate-
gic control framework.
5 Strategic Control
Returning back to the general scenario (1), we now consider
the situation where S and R have the following quadratic
finite horizon cost functions:
JS = E
{
n
∑
k=1
x′k+1QS,k+1xk+1+u
′
kRS,kuk
}
, (29)
JR = E
{
n
∑
k=1
x′k+1QR,k+1xk+1+u
′
kRR,kuk
}
, (30)
where QS,k+1,QR,k+1 ∈ Rp×p are positive semi-definite and
RS,k,RR,k ∈ Rt×t are positive definite. We note that if the
measurement signal rules were set to be linear, the problem
would become a stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG)
control problem. And the optimal control policy would then
be linear in the conditional estimate of the state given the
measurement signals, which can be calculated through the
Kalman filter [24]. However, for general measurement sig-
nals, e.g., nonlinear ones, the optimal control policy could
not even be expressed in closed form. Furthermore, for the
scalar case, if the measurement signals and the control in-
puts can be constructed within the class of general policies,
and there exists an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel between the sensor and the controller, reference [5]
shows that in the simultaneous design, the optimal per-
formance in terms of quadratic cost functions can be ob-
tained through linear control inputs, and measurement sig-
nals which are linear in the innovation in the state.
Example 8 The above is a general framework for non-
cooperative game formulations between S and R, which per-
mits analysis of the equilibrium achieving signaling rules
in the most general form. By adjusting the matrices, it is
possible to generate many different examples of stochastic
control/game problems in strategic environments. As one ex-
ample, there can be two separate controlled stochastic pro-
cesses:[
zk+1
θ k+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=xk+1
=
[
Az
Aθ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
[
zk
θ k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=xk
+
[
Bz
Bθ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
uk +
[
ω k
ν k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=wk
.
R aims to drive zk into her desired path, but the control
variable uk has also impact on the state θ k and S designs the
measurement signals so thatθ k is driven into his own desired
path not in line with R’s actual intent. In particular, in the
objective functions, QS,k =
[
O O
O Qθ ,k
]
and QR,k =
[
Qz,k O
O O
]
and
R seeks to minimize
E
{
n
∑
k=1
z′k+1Qz,k+1zk+1+u
′
kRR,kuk
}
, (31)
while S seeks to minimize
E
{
n
∑
k=1
θ ′k+1Qθ ,k+1θ k+1+u
′
kRS,kuk
}
.
Example 9 Another special case is one where while R seeks
to drive zk into her desired path, S wants zk to track an
exogenous process θ k, i.e., Bθ = O. Then, S’s cost function
is given by
n
∑
k=1
(zk+1−Dk+1θ k+1)′Qθ ,k+1(zk+1−Dk+1θ k+1)+u′kRS,kuk
9
and this corresponds to QS,k =
[
I
−D′k
]
Qθ ,k [ I −Dk ] in (29),
while R’s cost function is given by (31).
The following theorem now says that even though S and R
can select policies within the general class, e.g., any Borel
measurable function defined over the associated real product
spaces, linear S and R signaling rules attain the equilibrium.
Theorem 10 The Stackelberg equilibrium between S and R
for the cost functions (29) and (30) can be attained through
linear signaling rules.
PROOF. By completing the squares [5, 24], we can write
(29) as
n
∑
k=1
E{x′k+1QS,k+1xk+1+u′kRS,kuk}
=
n
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uk +KS,kxk‖2∆S,k
}
+∆S,0, (32)
where 9 KS,k = ∆−1S,kB
′Q˜S,k+1A, ∆S,k = B′Q˜S,k+1B+RS,k,
Q˜S,k = QS,k +A′(Q˜S,k+1− Q˜S,k+1B∆−1S,kB′Q˜S,k+1)A
Q˜S,n+1 = QS,n+1, ∆S,0 = tr{Q˜S,1Σ1}+
n
∑
k=1
tr{Q˜S,k+1Σw},
and set QS,1 = O. Correspondingly, (30) becomes
n
∑
k=1
E{x′k+1QR,k+1xk+1+u′kRR,kuk}
=
n
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uk +KR,kxk‖2∆R,k
}
+∆R,0, (33)
where KR,k = ∆−1R,kB
′Q˜R,k+1A, ∆R,k = B′Q˜R,k+1B+RR,k,
Q˜R,k = QR,k +A′(Q˜R,k+1− Q˜R,k+1B∆−1R,kB′Q˜R,k+1)A
Q˜R,n+1 = QR,n+1, ∆R,0 = tr{Q˜R,1Σ1}+
n
∑
k=1
tr{Q˜R,k+1Σw},
and set QR,1 = O. Then, through a change of variable,
n
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uk +KS,kxk‖2∆S,k
}
=
n
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uSk +KS,kxok‖2∆S,k
}
,
n
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uk +KR,kxk‖2∆R,k
}
=
n
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uRk +KR,kxok‖2∆R,k
}
,
where
uSk = uk +KS,kBuk−1+ · · ·+KS,kAk−2Bu1, (34)
uRk = uk +KR,kBuk−1+ · · ·+KR,kAk−2Bu1. (35)
9 The assumption RS,k,RR,k  O ensures that ∆S,k and ∆R,k are
non-singular.
Note that, the virtual state xok is independent of how the con-
trol inputs uk are constructed. Therefore, γk only impacts the
sub-cost function E{‖uRk +KR,kxok‖2∆R,k}. Correspondingly,
the best transformed control input is given by
uR∗k =−KR,kE{xok |y[1,k]} (36)
almost everywhere, which also implies that ΠR(η[1,n]) is
again a singleton. By (35) and (36), the optimal control
inputs u∗[1,n] satisfy the following relation:
u∗n...
u∗1
=−

I KR,nB KR,nAB ... KR,nAn−2B
I KR,n−1B ··· KR,n−1An−3B
I ··· KR,n−2An−4B
. . .
I

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: ΦR
−1[KR,n
. . .
KR,1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: KR
[ xˆon
...
xˆo1
]
,
where xˆok := E{xok |y[1,k]}. Corresponding to the optimal con-
trol inputs u∗[1,n], by (34), we have
uS∗n...
uS∗1
=−

I KS,nB KS,nAB ··· KS,nAn−2B
I KS,n−1B ··· KS,n−1An−3B
I ··· KS,n−2An−4B
. . .
I

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: ΦS
Φ−1R KR
[ xˆon
...
xˆo1
]
,
(37)
where TS := ΦSΦ−1R KR is a block upper triangular matrix
since it is a product of two upper triangular and one block
diagonal matrix.
Furthermore, we have
n
∑
k=1
E
{
‖uS∗k +KS,kxok‖2∆S,k
}
=
uS∗n +KS,nxon...
uS∗n +KS,1xo1
′
=: ∆S︷ ︸︸ ︷[∆S,n
. . .
∆S,1
]
×
uS∗n +KS,nxon...
uS∗n +KS,1xo1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
= uS∗+KSxo
(38)
and S faces the optimization problem:
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1,...,n
E
{‖−TSxˆo+KSxo‖2∆S}+∆S,0, (39)
since uS∗ = TSxˆo by (37). This yields
E
{‖−TSxˆo+KSxo‖2∆S}= tr{E{xo(xo)′}K′S∆SKS}
−2tr{E{xo(xˆo)′}T ′S∆SKS}+ tr{E{xˆo(xˆo)′}T ′S∆STS}. (40)
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Table 2
A description to compute equilibrium achieving sender policies
in strategic control.
Algorithm 2: Strategic Control
Transforming Problem into Strategic Communication:
Compute KS,k,KR,k, Q˜S,k, Q˜R,k,∆S,k, and ∆R,k for all
k = 1, . . . ,n by (32) and (33).
Compute Ξ and Ξo by (44).
Finally, compute V ok , ∀k, by (46).
Applying Algorithm 1:
Solve the SDP problem assocated with (45) through a
numerical toolbox and obtain the solution S∗k , ∀k.
Compute the corresponding idempotent matrices Pk,∀k,
by using S∗k , ∀k, and (19).
Compute the eigen decompositions: Pk =UkΛkU ′k.
Compute Lk, ∀k, by using S∗k−1,Uk,Λk, and (23).
And ηk(xo[1,k]) = L
′
kx
o
k .
The first term on the right hand side does not depend on the
optimization argument η[1,n]. Let Σok := E{xok(xok)′}, then we
have
Σo := E{xo(xo)′}=

Σon AΣon−1 ··· An−1Σo1
Σon−1A
′ Σon−1 ··· An−2Σo1...
...
. . .
...
Σo1(A
n−1)′ Σo1(A
n−2)′ ··· Σo1
 . (41)
Furthermore, let Hok :=E{xˆok(xˆok)′}. Then, E{xˆo(xˆo)′} can be
written as
E{xˆo(xˆo)′}=

Hon AH
o
n−1 ··· An−1Ho1
Hon−1A
′ Hon−1 ··· An−2Ho1...
...
. . .
...
Ho1 (A
n−1)′ Ho1 (A
n−2)′ ··· Ho1
 (42)
since for l < k, we have
E{xˆol (xˆok)′}= E{E{xˆol (xˆok)′|y[1,l]}}
(a)
= E{xˆol E{xˆok |y[1,l]}}
(b)
= E{xˆol (xˆol )′}(Ak−l)′,
where (a) holds since xˆol is σ -y[1,l] measurable, and (b)
follows due to the iterated expectations with nested condi-
tioning sets, i.e., {y[1,l]} ⊆ {y[1,k]}. We also note that for
l ≤ k, E{xˆol (xok)′} = E{xˆol (xol )′}(Ak−l)′ since v j, j > l, and
xˆol , which is σ -y[1,l] measurable, are independent of each
other and {wk} is a zero-mean white noise process, which
leads to E{xˆol (xol )′} = E{E{xˆol (xol )′|y[1,l]}} = E{xˆol (xˆol )′}
due to the law of iterated expectations. This implies that
E{xˆol (xok)′} = E{xˆol (xˆol )′}(Ak−l)′ = E{xˆol (xˆok)′} and corre-
spondingly E{xˆo(xo)′}= E{xˆo(xˆo)′}.
Next, we can rewrite (39) as
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1,...,n
tr


Hon AH
o
n−1 ··· An−1Ho1
Hon−1A
′ Hon−1 ··· An−2Ho1...
...
. . .
...
Ho1 (A
n−1)′ Ho1 (A
n−2)′ ··· Ho1
Ξ
+Ξo, (43)
where
Ξ := T ′S∆STS−T ′S∆SKS−K′S∆STS, (44a)
Ξo := tr{ΣoK′S∆SKS}+∆S,0, (44b)
which are independent of the optimization arguments.
Hence, the optimization problem (43) faced by S can be
written as an affine function of Hok ’s as follows:
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
tr{V ok Hok }+Ξo, (45)
for certain symmetric deterministic matrices V ok ∈Rp×p, k=
1, . . . ,n, which are given by
V ok := Ξk,k +
n
∑
l=k+1
Ξk,lAl−k +(Al−k)′Ξl,k, (46)
and Ξk,l is the corresponding p× p sub-block of Ξ. Theo-
rems 4 and 7 show that for jointly Gaussian parameters, the
solution for (45) can be attained by linear policies, i.e., ηk is
linear in xo[1,k]. For linear measurement signals, the problem
turns into a non-cooperative LQG problem and the corre-
sponding control input is linear in the measurement signals
and unique for given measurement policies [24]. In Table 2,
we provide a description to compute the equilibrium achiev-
ing sender strategies in strategic control scenarios. 
We note that if S’s signaling rules are also a function of
the actual state or the control inputs, this stochastic con-
trol problem would entail non-classical information. Corre-
spondingly, optimality of linear sender strategies would be
an open problem, and linearity may or may not hold within
the general class of strategies. However, it can be shown that
when S’s signaling rules are restricted to linear strategies
while also being a function of control inputs or the actual
state, corresponding optimal linear sender strategies could
be obtained via Algorithm 2. In the next section, we provide
some numerical examples.
6 Illustrative Examples
As numerical illustrations, we first consider Example 2 in
strategic communication formulation with cost functions
(10) and (11), where zk ∈ R, θ k ∈ R, and Dk = 1. We con-
sider two different scenarios: Scenario 1, where the process
{zk} is relatively more colored, i.e., more correlated in time,
than the process {θ k}, and Scenario 2, where the process
11
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Fig. 2. Scenario 1: the process {zk} is relatively less colored, i.e.,
less correlated in time, than the process {θ k}.
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Fig. 3. Scenario 2: the process {zk} is relatively more colored.
{θ k} is more colored. To this end, we set Σk and A as in (47)
and (48), introduced as parts of Figs. 2 and 3, respectively,
which yields that the underlying state process {xk ∈ R2} is
stationary and Σw = I.
We can compute the equilibrium achieving sender policies
Algorithm 1. After the computation, we observe that the
resulting weight matrices Lk ∈ R2×2, ∀k, have rank 1, and
indeed have a column that is full of zeros. Therefore, we can
consider that at stage k, S sends practically a scalar which
is a linear combination of zk and θ k to R. Additionally, we
can scale that sent signal by multiplying it with a certain
constant such that the weight of zk in the message is just 1.
In particular, the sent signal can be written as yk = zk+αkθ k
for a certain constant αk ∈ R. In Figs. 2 and 3, we plot
the time evolution of αk for different time horizons, e.g.,
n = 1, . . . ,10, in the Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. We
observe that the weight of zk and θ k increases or decreases
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Fig. 4. Scenario 3: the process {zk} is relatively less colored in
strategic control.
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Fig. 5. Scenario 4: the process {zk} is relatively more colored in
strategic control.
in time depending on their relative correlatedness in time.
As an example, in Scenario 1, the process {θ k} is relatively
more colored than the process {zk} and the weight of θ k,
i.e., αk, in the sent messages increases in time compared to
the weight of zk, i.e., 1. Additionally, the pattern that the
weightαk draws as the length of time horizon grows provides
an insight for the equilibrium achieving sender policies for
stationary state processes in infinite time horizon, e.g., after
a transient phase, the weights could reach a steady state
value as n→ ∞.
Furthermore, we also consider Example 9 in strategic control
formulation, where zk ∈ R, θ k ∈ R, and Dk = 1. Different
from the previous illustrative examples, here, B =
[
2
−1/2
]
and similar to Scenarios 1 and 2, we consider two new sce-
narios: Scenario 3, where the virtual process {zok} is rela-
tively more colored than the virtual process {θ ok}, and Sce-
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nario 4, where the virtual process {θ ok} is more colored.
To this end, we set Qθ ,k = Qz,k = RS,k = RR,k = 1, and A,
B, and Σok as in (49) and (50), introduced as parts of Figs.
4 and 5, respectively, which yields that the underlying vir-
tual state process {xok ∈ R2} is stationary and Σw = I. Sim-
ilar to Scenarios 1 and 2, we also observe that all the op-
timal weight matrices Lk ∈ R2×2 have rank 1 and S practi-
cally sends a scalar variable. Therefore, in Figs. 4 and 5, we
plot the change of αk within various time horizons, where
yk = zok +αkθ
o
k . We also note that the evolution of αk is very
much also dependent on B in addition to the relative color-
fulness of the virtual processes {zok} and {θ ok}.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed the existence and character-
ization of the equilibrium achieving sender strategies in hi-
erarchical signaling games with finite horizon, for quadratic
objective functions and multi-variate Gaussian processes.
Our main conclusion has been that linear sender (sensor)
and receiver (controller) strategies can yield the equilibrium
within the general class of policies in both strategic com-
munication and control scenarios. This settles an open ques-
tion on the structure of equilibrium achieving policies in dy-
namic strategic information transmission and strategic con-
trol within a Stackelberg game framework. We have also
provided algorithms to compute optimal strategies numeri-
cally. Some future directions of research on this topic include
characterization of the equilibrium achieving strategies in
closed forms and also their existence and characterization
for the infinite horizon case.
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A Proof of Lemma 3
The minimization problem in (15) can be written as
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
tr{VkE{xˆkxˆ′k}}= minηk∈Ωk,
k=1,...,n
n
∑
k=1
tr{VkHk}.
Note that the posterior covariances H1, . . . ,Hn depend on the
signaling rules η1, . . . ,ηn, and they are real and symmetric
matrices by definition. Next, we aim to find necessary con-
ditions on Hk’s to derive a tight lower bound on (15). To this
end, consider the following positive semi-definite matrix:
E{(xk− xˆk)(xk− xˆk)′}= Σk−Hk  O,
which implies Σk  Hk, for k = 1, . . . ,n. Furthermore, after
some algebra, it can be shown that
E{(xˆk−E{xk|y[1,k−1]})(xˆk−E{xk|y[1,k−1]})′}
= Hk−AHk−1A′, (A.1)
and therefore Hk−AHk−1A′ O and correspondingly Hk 
AHk−1A′.
The posterior covariances H1, . . . ,Hk are real, symmetric
matrices and should at least satisfy the constraints: Σ1 
H1 O, and Σk Hk  AHk−1A′, for k = 2, . . . ,n. Based on
this, we can formulate another optimization problem (18) in
which the optimization arguments S1, . . . ,Sn ∈ Sp are subject
to the constraints in (18). Since we have shown that those
constraints are necessary (not necessarily sufficient yet), the
minimization problem (18) is a lower bound on (15). Note
that by the linear objective function ∑k tr{VkSk} and the
semi-definiteness constraints on Sk, (18) is an SDP problem.
B Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose that E = (E1, . . . ,En) ∈ Ψ is an extreme point of
Ψ and there exists an element Ek such that Ek is not an
extreme point of Φk(E−k). Then, there exist two distinct
M,N ∈ Φk(E−k) such that Ek = tM + (1− t)N, for some
t ∈ (0,1). Note that since M,N ∈ Φk(E−k), the matrices M
and N satisfy
A−1Ek+1(A′)−1 M  AEk−1A′,
A−1Ek+1(A′)−1  N  AEk−1A′
by (21). Therefore,
EM := (E1, . . . ,Ek−1,M,Ek+1, . . . ,En) ∈Ψ,
EN := (E1, . . . ,Ek−1,N,Ek+1, . . . ,En) ∈Ψ,
and EM 6= EN since M 6= N. However, we can write the
extreme point E as E = tEM +(1− t)EN , for some t ∈ (0,1)
even though EM,EN ∈Ψ, and this leads to a contradiction.
Hence, if (E1, . . . ,En) ∈Ψ is an extreme point, the elements
Ek are the extreme points of the corresponding sub-constraint
sets Φk(E−k).
C Proof of Lemma 6
Note that eigenvalues of a symmetric idempotent matrix are
either 0 or 1, and suppose that for a symmetric idempotent
matrix P ∈ Φ, there exist two distinct symmetric matrices
M ∈Φ and N ∈Φ such that P= tM+(1− t)N for some t ∈
(0,1). Let p1, p0 ∈ Rp be eigenvectors of P corresponding
to eigenvalues 1 and 0, respectively. Note that since the
eigenvalues of M and N are bounded, for any vector p∈Rp,
0 ≤ p′Mp ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p′N p ≤ 1. Then, through convex
combination, we have
t p′1Mp1+(1− t)p′1N p1 = p′1Pp1 = 1,
t p′0Mp0+(1− t)p′0N p0 = p′0Pp0 = 0,
which leads to p′1Mp1 = p
′
1N p1 = 1 and p
′
0Mp0 = p
′
0N p0 =
0. Therefore, p1 and p0 are eigenvectors of M and N. Fur-
thermore, the eigenvalues of M and N corresponding to the
eigenvectors p1 and p0 are 1 and 0, respectively. Since p1
and p0 are arbitrary eigenvectors of P, the matrices M and
N have the same eigenvalues and eigenvectors with P, and
correspondingly P = M = N, which, however, yields a con-
tradiction. In view of these contradictions, we can say that
a symmetric idempotent matrix is an extreme point of Φ.
Lastly, we aim to show that any other matrix which
is not an idempotent matrix, say Z, cannot be an ex-
treme point of Φ. Let Z have an eigen-decomposition
Z = Qdiag(λ1, . . . ,λp)Q′. Since Z is not an idempotent
matrix, there exists an eigenvalue, say λi, which is neither
1 nor 0. Then, for any t ∈ (0,1), there exist two distinct
λi,1,λi,2 ∈ [0,1] such that λi = tλi,1 + (1− t)λi,2, e.g., set
λi,1 = λi/t and λi,2 = 0. Correspondingly, for the matrices
M := Qdiag(. . . ,λi,1, . . .)Q′ and N := Qdiag(. . . ,λi,2, . . .)Q′,
we have Z = tM +(1− t)N, yet M 6= N, i.e., Z is not an
extreme point of Φ.
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